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Much of the debate about genocide in Darfur appears woefully misinformed about
the complex realities of the crisis, in particular its growing imbrication with the
conflict in neighboring Chad. The parallel with Rwanda is limited, even though, in
both cases, the international community has failed utterly to stop the atrocities
committed against innocent civilians. No prevention strategy is likely to succeed
unless cross-border raids from Chad into Darfur and vice versa are stopped, and
this will not happen as long as the Sudanese and Chadian authorities are playing
one faction off against another in what looks increasingly like a proxy war.
Genocide should not be seen as the sole touchstone for intervention. War crimes,
ethnic cleansing, and atrocity crimes, to name only some of the horrors illustrated
by the Darfur tragedy, provide ample justification, moral and political, for the
international community to take concerted action to protect civilian lives. The most
urgent task facing the international community is not to strive for a consensus
about genocide but to frame an effective prevention strategy. For this to happen,
immediate attention must be paid to the crisis in Chad, which could unleash
renewed cross-border violence, destabilize the De´by regime in Ndjamena, and
ultimately play into the hands of Khartoum.
There is no sign of an early end to Darfur’s agonies. If anything, the growing
interconnection between insurgents in the Western Sudan and their allies in Chad has
made a viable solution all the more remote.1 Since February 2003, when Arab–African
tensions erupted into a full-scale confrontation, anywhere from 200,000 to 400,000
have perished in the course of the violence unleashed by Khartoum-backed militias
(Janjaweeds) upon civilians, to which must be added 1.8 million displaced in Darfur
and 200,000 inside Chad. Dozens of villages in that country, north and south of the
strategic border town of Adre´, have been the targets of murderous cross-border raids
mounted by Arab militias. The litany of crimes committed by the ‘‘evil horsemen’’—the
literal meaning of ‘‘Janjaweed’’—ranges from the killing and maiming of civilians
to rape and abduction, and from the burning down of houses and shelters to the
destruction of farmland and the theft of cattle. In the climate of insecurity spreading
across the hundreds of kilometers of borderlands, the capacity of humanitarian non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to reach the growing population of refugees and
internally displaced persons (IDPs) whose lives are at risk is becoming ever more
limited.
The political risks and the costs in human lives are not limited to Darfur. In
southern Sudan, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 9 January 2005,
intended to bring to an end the long simmering North–South civil war, is gravely
imperiled. And the prospects of widening factional violence in Chad loom increasingly
large on the horizon. As Nicholas Kristof has correctly observed, ‘‘Chad may collapse
into civil war, chaos and banditry, like Darfur itself but on a much larger scale.’’2
With an ever-greater number of Chadian and Darfurian Africans seeking Khartoum’s
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assistance in their fight against the Chadian regime, the ethno-political equation is
every day becoming more complicated.
The thoroughly inadequate response of the international community in the face
of such unmitigated human disaster raises further questions. As is becoming more
evident every day, the performance of the African Union (AU) in Darfur—officially
designated as the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)—falls short of expectations.
Only under considerable international pressure and promise of financial assistance,
following the collapse of the 8 April 2004 ceasefire agreement between the Sudanese
government and the insurgents, did the AU agree to send in a monitoring force of some
4,000 men, consisting in large part of Nigerians (1,200) and a few hundred Rwandan
troops. To this must be added 700 military observers, whose observations have done
little to lower the temperature. Despite generous funding from the United States and
the European Union—estimated at half a billion US dollars—the AU mission has been
notoriously ineffective in preventing the raiders from committing atrocities against
civilians.
Samantha Power’s sobering assessment is worth bearing in mind:
The AU mission is clearly overwhelmed. Its teams, spread out across an area the size of
France, manage at most three patrols per day in various sectors of the region, and
African countries are hardly eager to send in more soldiers . . . . Soon this stopgap
mission will fail not only those in need of protection but all the other interested parties
as well. The Western powers have already spent more than a billion dollars feeding
refugees in camps that feel increasingly permanent, and it is nearly inevitable that, as
in the West Bank and Pakistan, some Muslims in these camps will be radicalized and
take up arms locally, or, perhaps, further afield.3
The image of radicalized refugees ‘‘taking up arms locally, or, perhaps, further
afield’’ brings to mind another crisis situation of appalling proportions: more than a
million Hutu refugees sought asylum in eastern Congo in the wake of the Rwandan
genocide, including hundreds, possibly thousands, of ge´nocidaires who later launched
deadly raids into Rwanda. But the fate of Hutu refugees in eastern Congo is by no
means the only—or, indeed, the most relevant—parallel with the situation in Darfur.
The Ghosts of Rwanda
If anyone deserves credit for drawing public attention to our inability to learn any
lesson from the Rwandan carnage, it is Eric Reeves, whose eloquent wake-up calls in
the media and on the Internet have yet to be heeded by policy makers. Comparing
AMIS to the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), headed by Lt. Gen. Rome´o
Dallaire, he notes that ‘‘we are witnessing an equivalently dishonest and cowardly
failure’’ and that ‘‘the AU is no more capable of halting the ongoing destruction of
primarily African tribal populations than Dallaire was able to halt the interahamwe or
deter Hutu extremists of the Rwandan government and military.’’ ‘‘The ghosts of
Rwanda,’’ Reeves concludes, ‘‘are stirring ominously in Darfur. Differences in
geography, history, and genocidal means do less and less to obscure the ghastly
similarities between international failure in 1994 and the world’s current willingness
to allow ethnically-targeted human destruction to proceed essentially unchecked.’’ And
because of this appalling inertia, leading to a death toll ‘‘exceeding 400,000,’’ he
speculates that ‘‘with human mortality poised to increase significantly in coming
weeks and months, there is no clear evidence that Rwanda’s unspeakable slaughter
will not eventually be numerically surpassed.’’4
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Not even the most casual observer of Darfur’s agony can remain insensitive to the
scale of the human suffering unfolding in this forbidding dystopia. But it takes more
than a superficial acquaintance with the history, geography, and politics of the region
to appreciate how radically different from that of Rwanda is the context of the killings
in Darfur. Unlike Rwanda (26,000km2), Darfur covers a huge expanse of territory. In a
space of some 450,000km2, approximately ten times the size of Rwanda, the population
is estimated to be between 3.5 and 4 million,5 that is, half that of Rwanda, much of it
distributed among scores of small village communities. This basic fact speaks volumes
about the enormous logistical difficulties facing the now 7,000-strong AU monitoring
force in its Sisyphean efforts to stop the hemorrhage.
Whether the carnage should be seen as genocide or as a case of ethnic cleansing
run amok is where the Rwanda analogy begs the question, and opinions differ. While
the official stance of the Bush administration is unequivocal in its use of the ‘‘G-word,’’
the European Union and the United Nations have been notoriously reluctant to
describe the killings in such terms. For all his searing criticisms of the Bush policies in
Darfur, Eric Reeves is clearly on the same wavelength in detecting ‘‘genocidal intent.’’
In his testimony before the Africa Subcommittee of the US House of Representatives
on 11 March 2004, Reeves explained that while ‘‘the current phrase of choice among
diplomats and UN officials is ‘ethnic cleansing,’ given the nature and scale of human
destruction and the clear racism animating attacks systematically directed against
civilians from the African tribal groups, the appropriate term is genocide.’’6 Nicholas
Kristof—who, in his New York Times op-eds, has done more to sensitize the American
public to the horrors of Darfur than most other commentators—would concur.
‘‘Darfur,’’ he writes, ‘‘is just the latest chapter in a sorry history of repeated inaction in
the face of genocide, from that of Armenians, through the Holocaust, to the slaughter of
Cambodians, Bosnians and Rwandans.’’7
It is noteworthy, however, that both Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch (HRW) have carefully avoided the use of the word, opting instead for ‘‘ethnic
cleansing’’ as a more appropriate term.8 Similarly, the 2004 Report of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur grudgingly admits that human rights violations were
committed ‘‘by people who might have acted with genocidal intentions,’’ but concludes
that ‘‘there was not sufficient evidence to indicate that Khartoum had a state policy
intended to exterminate a particular racial or ethnic groups.’’9
Given that there are differences of opinion among scholars as to what constitutes
genocide, such divergences of opinion are not too surprising. For some, the question of
establishing the evidence of genocide is irrelevant; more important is to use the
‘‘G-word’’ as a tool to mobilize public opinion. For others, however, the crucial issue is
whether we are dealing with genocide as defined in the 1948 UN Convention on
Genocide (‘‘deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part’’) or something else—e.g., ethnic
cleansing, or the use of force to crush a rebellion. For Ge´rard Prunier, much depends
on how we define genocide: ‘‘if we use the 1948 UN definition it is obvious that Darfur
is a genocide,’’ but not if by genocide we mean a ‘‘total obliteration’’ of the victim
group.10 In an article whose title questions what others have taken for granted—‘‘Is It
Genocide?’’11—Nelson Kasfir argues that even though there is no doubt about the
identity of the perpetrators, or about their determination to destroy ‘‘in whole or in
part’’ the African population, the element of intent remains unclear. He suggests that
the aim of Khartoum could just as well be seen as an attempt to crush a rebellion, not
to commit genocide. This is consistent with the distinction drawn by Jacques Se´melin
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between genocide, which involves ‘‘the total eradication of a collectivity, as defined by
those whose self-assigned task is to annihilate it,’’ and ethnic cleansing or massacres
aimed at enforcing submission.12 For Se´melin—and many others—the killings in
Darfur would fit into the latter category, involving a partial destruction in order to
bring about global submission.13
Compounding the difficulty of establishing genocidal intent is the problem of
discriminating between Arabs and Africans, where both share many of the same
cultural traits, including religion and language, and where both victims and killers are
found among members of the same community.
Africans vs. Arabs?
As Darfur’s name indicates, the Fur people has given its name to an area that
comprises not just the Fur but a complex mix of African and Arab populations. ‘‘The
population of Darfur,’’ Gustav Nachtigal wrote in the 1870s, ‘‘may be divided on
the one hand into Negroes and Arabs, or on the other into its original inhabitants and
the conquered peoples or foreigners.’’14 This Arab/African polarity did not rule out a
common set of regional identities, or, for that matter multiple identities. A central
theme of Darfur’s precolonial history refers to the process of early state formation
around the ancient seventeenth-century sultanate whose core area was the
mountainous region of Jebel Marra. Territorial expansion went hand in hand with
ethnic absorption, with the Fur people serving as the pivot around which a specific
ethno-regional identity eventually developed.15 Anyone familiar with Nachtigal’s
painstaking description of the ‘‘Organization of the Fur State’’16 cannot fail to be
impressed by the extraordinary complexity and highly bureaucratized character of
this archaic yet inherently fragile state system, soon to collapse under the combined
onslaught of the Turco-Egyptian conquest, the Mahdist revolt,17 and, ultimately,
the imposition of colonial controls. The resulting political vacuum has yet to be filled.
However dated—and not always exempt of ethnic biases18—Nachtigal’s narrative
makes clear to the reader the danger of reducing Darfurians to a simple racial
dichotomy. Cutting across the ‘‘Negro vs. Arab’’ fault line, he notes, are countless other
divisions, as between those who pay tribute and those who do not, those ‘‘who have
equal rights’’ and those who do not, those who are of foreign origins (from Bornu and
Baguirmi) and the autochthons, those tribes that were conquered and those that
successfully resisted conquest, and so forth.19 Some groups are nomads, others semi-
nomads or sedentary, among both Africans and Arabs. And there are those Africans
‘‘who appear by mixing with Arab tribes to have been transformed centuries ago,
and now live in Darfur among the Rezeqat, where they can no longer be distinguished
from the Arabs either physically or socially.’’20 By way of example, Nachtigal cites
a Zaghawa sub-group, the ‘‘Zoghawa [sic] Amm Kimmelte,’’ which comes as a surprise
when one considers the strong and unanimous identification of today’s Zaghawa with
the African community.
The Arabs, likewise, are divided into numerous sub-groups, some of which are
found in both Chad and Sudan. In his listing of ‘‘major non-Arab groups’’ and ‘‘major
Arab groups,’’ Alex de Waal, a leading authority on Darfur, comes up with a total of
seven Arab and fifteen non-Arab communities, each in turn divided into subcategories.
Although Arabs form the bulk of the Janjaweed—the instrument used by Khartoum to
kill, maim, or displace Africans civilians—de Waal notes that ‘‘the largest and most
influential of Darfur’s Arabs are not involved, including the Baggara, Rizeigat,
Genocide Studies and Prevention 1:1 July 2006
4
the Habbaniya, the Ma’aliya, and most of the Ta’aisha.’’21 As in Rwanda, the tendency
in Darfur is to identify the ‘‘bad guys’’ with an entire ethnic community.
The distinction between Arabs and Africans is, to a large extent, a social construct
(not unlike the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi). De Waal calls the Arab vs. African
dichotomy ‘‘historically bogus, but disturbingly powerful.’’22 The labels, after all, are by
no means exclusive. There has been in the past considerable intermarriage between
the two groups, and identity switches are by no means uncommon, a phenomenon
again reminiscent of relations between Hutu and Tutsi. Both communities are Muslim,
and Arabic is widely spoken among them. Although sporadic conflicts between Arabs
and Africans were not unheard of in colonial and precolonial times, the scale of today’s
carnage has no precedent in history. What is unprecedented, too, is the extent to which
ideology and propaganda, originating from within and outside Sudan, have
contributed to the growing polarization of ethnic identities.
The Roots of Carnage
As in the case of Rwanda, no single-factor analysis will do to explain the cause of
Darfur’s tragedy. We are confronted with an array of forces and circumstances that
goes far beyond the boundaries of Sudan. Most observers would agree that the
triggering factor was the surprise attack on El Fasher, in April 2003, by the Sudan
Liberation Army (SLA), the principal and earliest insurgent faction, resulting in the
destruction of seven military aircraft and the death of about 100 people. But El Fasher
was only the symptom of more fundamental factors.
Of these, perhaps the most consequential has to do with the steady advance of
desertification through much of northern Darfur, resulting in devastating famine.
According to Prunier, what is known locally as the maja’a al-gutala (‘‘the famine that
kills’’) caused the death of an estimated 95,000 people from August 1984 to November
1985.23 With the massive population movements from north to south—and with Arab
cattle herders moving in ever-increasing numbers into those areas of the south less
affected by the drought—a series of local clashes over land erupted, first between Fur
and Arabs in the Jebel Marra area (1987–1989), then between Massalit and Arabs
(1996–1998).24 Each time the parties to a conflict reached out to the Arab-dominated
provincial government for a fair settlement, the government consistently sided with
the Arabs.
The spread of a stridently pro-Islamic ideology did little to diminish the
government’s blatant favoritism toward Arabs. The roots of what de Waal calls ‘‘an
Arab supremacist ideology’’ are to be found, in part, in ideas indigenous to the Sudan—
generally associated with Hasan al-Turabi’s National Islamic Front and later his
Popular Congress. Just as important, however, has been the export of ‘‘Arabism’’ from
Chad and Libya.
The Chadian side of the story, in a nutshell, involves a warlord named Acyl
Ahmed, who, as head of the Arme´e du Volcan in the late 1970s and early 1980s, was
able to mobilize a large number of Chadian Arabs against Hisse`ne Habre´’s Forces
Arme´es du Nord (‘‘Northern Army’’). Of all the Trojan horses produced by Colonel
Muammar Gaddafi’s stable, Acyl was by far the most faithful. Although he died in
1982, his pro-Arab ideology is still alive. For this, much of the credit goes to Gaddafi.
After suffering a major defeat in northern Chad at the hands of Habre´ in 1987, the
Libyan leader turned his attention to Darfur. To carve out for himself another sphere
of influence and hold aloft the banner of the ‘‘Arab Gathering’’ (Al tajammu al-arabi)—
a ‘‘militantly racist and pan-Arabist organization,’’ Prunier informs us25—some 2,000
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Islamic Legion troops were sent to Darfur in 1987. The ideological seeds of the present
conflict, in short, were planted long before the attack on El Fasher.26
Exactly how the southern rebellion has affected its counterpart in Darfur is not
entirely clear. Through the years, going back to the Federal Democratic Alliance of
former Darfur governor Ibrahim Deraige, the Southern Peoples Liberation Army
(SPLA) has given moral and financial support to the African resistance in Darfur, but
in so doing it has unwittingly stimulated factional disputes about the distribution of
arms and money. If the SPLA struggle in the south served as an example to emulate,
this does not mean that it has always been to the advantage of the Darfurian rebels.
Again, considerable ambiguity surrounds the fallout of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) signed by Khartoum and the SPLA in the south in January 2005.
The effect, arguably, has been to encourage the insurgents to make every effort to
wrest a similar agreement from Khartoum, while at the same time contributing to a
hardening of the position of the central government on meeting their demands: after
virtually giving up the monopoly of the ruling party, in line with the CPA, it is now
dead set against any further erosion of its executive power.
A Fractured Insurgency
The fragmentation of the insurgency into rival factions, though rarely mentioned—let
alone explicated—in the media, is not the least of the obstacles to peace. Only recently
has Kristof—one the most insistent and articulate critics of Western policies in
Darfur—grudgingly recognized that ‘‘some responsibility attaches to the rebels in
Darfur,’’ as ‘‘they have been fighting each other instead of negotiating a peace with the
government that would end the bloodbath.’’27 Yet there has been bitter infighting
among rebels almost from the beginning. No sooner was the SLA created, in early
2003, than a violent struggle for the leadership of the movement began to surface.
Today, the bulk of the insurgents are drawn from the Zaghawa, Fur, and Massalit
‘‘tribes,’’ with the Zaghawa straddling the boundary between Chad and Darfur. Each is
divided into sub-groups, with the Zaghawa, for example, split between Tuer, Bideyat,
and Kobe, and each sub-group in turn divided into clans. The persistence of intra-
Zaghawa factionalism, as we shall see, is crucial to an understanding of the complex
interconnections between the Darfur-based insurgents and their kinsmen in Chad.
If the Zaghawa have been the driving force behind the insurgency, this is because
many ‘‘had acquired professional military training in the Chadian or Sudanese armies,
a fact that has caused them to predominate in the upper ranks of the insurgency to this
day.’’28 This also helps explain why they came to be viewed with considerable suspicion
by Fur and Massalit elements—but leaves unanswered the question of how they ended
up fighting each other. Part of the answer lies in the multiplicity of sub-ethnic and
clanic fissures among the Zaghawa. The really critical factor, however, has to do with
the impact of Chadian politics on the rebellion. Just as Darfur has had a significant
backlash effect in Chad, the reverse is equally true.29
The insurgents are divided into two principal rival armed factions, the SLA and
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the latter, the weaker of the two, drawing
much of its support from Zaghawa Kobe and the former from Tuer and Bideyat as well
as Fur and Massalit. The SLA, founded in February 2003, is decidedly secular in
orientation, while the JEM remains highly receptive to Hasan al-Turabi’s brand of
Islamic ideology.30 The SLA, moreover, claims a more diversified ethnic membership,
which is also why it is more vulnerable to internal dissention.
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The early history of the SLA provides a dramatic illustration of the potential for
disintegration inherent in its ethnic composition. At first, every effort was made to
include representatives of each major ethnic group in its leadership. Thus, while the
chairmanship of the movement was given to a Fur (Abdel Wahid Mohammed el-Nur),
the deputy chairmanship went to a Massalit (Mansour Arbab) and the military
command to a Zaghawa (Abdallah Abakar, replaced after his death by Minni Arko
Minnawi). After receiving substantial support from Zaghawa elements in the Chadian
military, Minnawi’s Zaghawa scored a number of military successes against the
Khartoum government, only to raise the anxieties of Fur elements. A bitter struggle
for leadership ensued between Fur and Zaghawa. In the words of a recent
International Crisis Group report,
the rapid expansion and intensification of the conflict overwhelmed the leaders and
their nascent structures. Over time, the animosity between Minni and Abdel Wahid
grew as they jostled for primacy. Whereas Minni assumes that Zaghawa military
strength should be reflected in the leadership, Abdel Wahid and other non-Zaghawa
insist on the original tribal allocations of positions, including a Fur as chairman.31
Although the origins of divisions within the insurgency are inseparable from
Darfur’s fragmented social identities, thesedivisionshavebeengreatly intensifiedby the
growing involvement of Chadian factions in the politics of the rebellion, and vice versa.
The Chadian Connection
Long before the emergence of Darfur as a flashpoint of conflict, the Sudan had been a
key player in the struggle for power between Idriss Deby, Chad’s incumbent president,
a Zaghawa of Bideyat origins, and his immediate rival, Hisse`ne Habre´. If Deby
ultimately came out on top, routing Habre´ and his Toubou warriors in the course of a
daring raid on Ndjamena in December 1990, it was because of the massive support he
received from Darfur-based Zaghawa elements, many of Kobe origin, with the
blessings of Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Beshir. His indebtedness to al-Beshir
helps explain Deby’s initial reluctance to get involved on the side of the insurgents.
By late 2005, however, he had no other choice but to turn against his former ally.
On 7 December 2005, a Sudan-backed Chadian rebel faction based in Darfur attacked
Guereda, some 120km north of Adre´, killing ten Chadians and wounding five. A few
days later, on 18 December, an even more brutal raid was launched on Adre´.
The attacks were promptly denounced by Deby as a Khartoum-instigated maneuver
to destabilize his regime.
It is easy to see, in such circumstances, why Deby should be viewed with the
greatest distaste by his former benefactor. Perhaps less obvious is that after
consistently playing one faction off against another, and with his army on the verge
of disintegration, Deby now has very little room to maneuver. For fear of antagonizing
Khartoum, he first turned down demands for assistance from the SLA while secretly
encouraging the rise of a breakaway faction within the Kobe-dominated JEM,
the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD). Another split emerged
in April 2005 following a trial of strength between JEM’S field commander,
Mohammed Salih Harba, and its top leader, Khalil Ibrahim, leading to the creation
of a Provisional Revolutionary Collective Leadership Council, causing some observers
to see in this latest dissidence the evil hand of Idriss Deby.
The result of all this has been a drastic shrinkage of Deby’s bases of support within
the army, as shown by the recent defections suffered by his 30,000-strong Chadian
National Army (CNA). Top-heavy, poorly trained, rife with internecine quarrels over
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pay and promotions, the upper ranks of the military include no fewer than sixty
generals and 256 colonels.32 Exactly how many have joined the insurgents is unknown.
Reports indicate that on 9 December 2005, at least 349 soldiers and eighty-two officers
joined the rebellion; another 400 troops followed on 16 February 2006, led by generals
Seby Aguid and Issaka Diar, along with some thirty high-ranking officers. Many of the
defectors are of Kobe origin and are deeply resentful of Deby’s indifference to the fate
of their kinsmen across the border in Darfur. But there is also growing evidence that
they have been joined by a fair number of Bideyat, whose grievances stem from Deby’s
less than cooperative attitude in meeting the demands of the SLA. A major blow to the
regime came with the defection of Tom Erdimi, a prominent Zaghawa, who once served
as coordinator of the Chadian petroleum project. His ‘‘Socle pour le Changement,
l’Unite´ et la De´mocratie’’ (‘‘Base for Change, Unity, and Democracy’’; SCUD) has since
emerged as a key anti-Deby politico-military group.33
Further complicating the political equation, a large number of Chadian Arabs have
joined hands with the Janjaweed, while a growing number of Chadian and Darfurian
Africans are being supported by Khartoum in their efforts to destabilize the Deby
regime. One well-informed Chadian observer told this writer, in March 2004, that the
majority of the Arabs involved in human rights abuses were Chadian Arabs, many of
Juhaina origins. Their expectation, presumably, is that Khartoum will return the
favor and help them overthrow Deby, in a replay of the scenario that brought Deby to
power in 1990. While the recruitment of Chadian Arabs has been going on since 2004,
if not earlier, only now is fear of retaliation by non-Arab Chadians an important motive
for crossing into Darfur. In the words of a recent Human Rights Watch (HRW) report,
‘‘Chadian Arabs from the area south of Adre´ have recently been crossing into Sudan in
numbers significant enough to raise concern among humanitarian workers that the
migration is being driven by fear of retaliatory attacks at the hands of non-Arabs.’’34
Arabs are not the only group seeking Deby’s overthrow. The rebel attack that
nearly brought down the Ndjamena regime on 14 April 200635 must be credited to the
‘‘Front Uni pour le Changement De´mocratique’’ (‘‘United Front for Democratic
Change’’; FUC), led by Mahamat Nour, a Chadian African of Tama origins whose
political base is the ‘‘Rassemblement pour la De´mocratie et la Liberte´’’ (‘‘Gathering for
Democracy and Freedom’’; RDL), a predominantly Tama organization and one of
several groups affiliated to the FUC. Significantly, Nour is said to enjoy the full
backing of Khartoum in his fight against Deby. Suffice it to say that it was none other
than Nour who, back in 2003, took the initiative in organizing groups of Janjaweed,
with Khartoum’s blessings.
How to prevent the army from unraveling is the key issue facing Deby. It lies at
the heart of the stalemate between the Chadian government and the World Bank.36
The bank’s decision to freeze Chad’s offshore oil–revenue account is understandable,
given that the government is in material breach of its loan contract. Deby’s immediate
concern, however, is to find the financial resources needed to avoid a further
disintegration of his armed forces. Although the domestic backlash of the Darfur
insurgency poses a clear and present danger to his Zaghawa-dominated state, whether
he can throw to the winds his obligation to set aside a substantial portion of
the oil revenue for poverty alleviation and still meet the demands of the army is
anybody’s guess.
With the emergence of Chadian opposition factions seeking sanctuary in Darfur,
new actors have entered the fray, determined to overthrow the Deby regime. Since the
attack on Adre´ by the RDL, a Chadian faction based in Darfur, six other opposition
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movements have joined the RDL to form the FUC. So far the SCUD has been unwilling
to rally to the FUC. Khartoum apparently made every effort to persuade Nour to hand
the leadership of the coalition to Tom Erdimi, an invitation Nour promptly declined.37
The factional split between Tama and Zaghawa is only one of the many fractures
undermining the Chadian opposition. Whether and how far to enter into a tactical
alliance with Khartoum is another source of division. The stakes, in short, are
perceived differently depending on the groups concerned, their ethno-regional profile,
and their leadership patterns.
The Limits of the Genocide Template
Given the complexity of the forces on the ground, questions are bound to arise as to the
pertinence of the genocide model as a point of entry for explicating the Darfur crisis.
Unfortunately, there seems to be growing confusion among scholars and observers
between honest disagreements and what passes for an unacceptable denial of genocide.
It is one thing to posit genocide as a given, from which are derived certain logical
conclusions about the state of the play on the ground, and quite another to proceed by
induction to test the validity of that assumption.
From all the evidence available, there are serious reasons to question the identities
of the targeted groups, the extent to which the perpetrators are manipulated by
Khartoum, and their intent to exterminate. Today the struggle is not only between
Arabs and Africans but among Africans. Furthermore, while there is considerable
evidence to show the involvement of the Khartoum authorities in recruiting and
arming Arab militias, Je´roˆme Tubiana, a leading French authority on Darfur, paints a
more complex situation in which ‘‘the extent to which the Sudan government controls
the janjawids remains unclear.’’38 He cites a Fur intellectual to the effect that ‘‘the
government has in part lost control (of the janjawids)’’ and goes on to note that
control over the Arab militias operates within three circles: the first consists of local
leaders, including traditional chiefs, politicians and intellectuals . . . , the second
involves Darfur-based Arab personalities, army men and politicians, close to the
seats of power in Khartoum, who act as intermediaries between Khartoum and local
leaders . . . , [and] the third refers to the hard-liners in Khartoum, i.e. Jellaba Arabs
from north Sudan, specifically Shagiya Arabs. This Shagiya circle would seem to have
gained sufficient weight to challenge president al Beshir himself, also a Jellaba, but
who belongs to the Jaalin group.39
Control over the Chadian Arabs would seem to lie primarily with the first of these
groups. As for the key element in the definition of genocide, the intent to exterminate,
the record shows that such has not always been the case. In the words of the most
recent HRW report on Darfur,
as markets in Darfur have been disrupted by violence and population dislocation,
normal commerce is being replaced by a war economy in which livestock raiding and
looting feature prominently. Hence, janjawids cross-border raids appear to be
motivated heavily by considerations of profit, as cattle, horses, food and even household
items such as straw mats and cups have been looted . . .Statements attributed to
janjawids by eyewitnesses suggest that the appropriation of land may be another
motivation for the violence.40
What emerges from all this is a pattern of violence aimed at the forced removal of
specific ethnic communities, a phenomenon much closer to ethnic cleansing than to
genocide. This does not mean that the abominations committed against Africans by
Arabs, or by other African rebel groups, are less objectionable than those described as
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genocidal killings, or that ethnic cleansing or ‘‘massive violations of human rights,’’
to use Kofi Annan’s expression, deserve less moral attention. Scale makes little
difference when human lives are at stake. What it does mean is that analysts owe it to
themselves to be self-conscious in their use of language when it comes to making sense
of mass violence.
There are practical implications as well. One is compelled to wonder whether
accusations of genocide, given the ambiguity of the evidence, are the best way to induce
a change of attitude on the part of the Khartoum authorities. Which is not to say that
a different language would produce miracles. At first grudgingly amenable to a UN
intervention, the al-Beshir government is now adamantly opposed to a transfer of
responsibility for peacekeeping to the UN, and there is no indication that the African
Union is prepared to challenge that decision, even though it has agreed ‘‘in principle to
a transition from AMIS to a UN operation.’’41 While the dialogue between Khartoum
and the international community appears to have reached an impasse, the AU
is unwilling to take a firm stand on the atrocities committed by the Sudan government.
If anything, the AU’s decision to block an EU-sponsored resolution in the UN General
Assembly’s social and humanitarian committee to end the culture of impunity and
disarm the militias responsible for the massacres—while reminding donors that
‘‘an average of US$22,857,719 is required in cash each month’’ for AMIS to continue
its operations42—smacks of humbug. So, too, the explanation proffered by Nigeria,
representing the AU, to the effect that ‘‘any condemnatory action would endanger the
peace talks.’’43 When one considers the AU’s apparent determination to stymie all
attempts at blowing the whistle on Khartoum, the ongoing debate about genocide
sounds distressingly hollow.
There are ample reasons to agree with Scott Straus that the debate about genocide
misses the central point about Darfur:
Darfur has shown that the energy spent fighting over whether to call the events there
‘‘genocide’’ was misplaced, overshadowing difficult but more important questions about
how to craft an effective response to mass violence against civilians in Sudan. The task
ahead is to do precisely that: to find a way to stop the killing, lest tens of thousands
more die.44
Those lines were written in late 2004. Since then thousands have died.
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